Introduction
India and China, both heirs to ancient civilisations, have emerged today as the two most powerful and influential Asian nations in terms of their economic capabilities and geopolitical standing. The two erstwhile adversaries have recognised the need for casting off the baggage of history and residual mistrust and have embarked on the path of forging a new pragmatic partnership. There are two mutually reinforcing components to this new partnership. One, both continues to have a vested interest in a peaceful neighbourhood to focus on an uninterrupted process of economic and technological progress and to sustain their steady rise as important centres of power. Two, there is a greater understanding on the part of both China and India that cooperation could work to their mutual advantage and benefit. Any conflict between the two would not only jeopardise their national security, but would also have serious implications for their regional and global security perspectives. It would also go a long way in positioning Asia as the fulcrum of the future world order, a prospect which would only be in their long-term economic and strategic interest. 2 However, despite the recognition that cooperation may be in their mutual interest, this is easier said than done. Sino-Indian relations have always been complex with multilayered regional and global dimensions which have complicated their bilateral relationships. Even as India and China have traversed a long road from being friends to adversaries to pragmatic partners, a factor which has been constant in the conduct of their affairs is the fact that they are neighbours and geopolitical rivals who have as much to gain from each other as to fear from the other. It is argued in the following pages that Sino-Indian relations, driven as they will by the primacy of national strategic interests and quest for global influence, will continue to remain subjected to diverse pulls and pressures from their competing interests. A stable and cooperative relationship, which seems to be more or less 'in the cards' of the foreseeable future, thus would not necessarily be translated into a closer relationship between the two Asian giants. It is contended that regardless of the thrust and pace of mutual engagement (cooperation), relationship between the two largest Asian countries will inevitably have strong undercurrents of contest and rivalry as they seek the same economic and political space for future interaction. On that account, it will be essentially not so much as to how India and China perceive the gains and opportunities of mutual cooperation, but how they manage their geopolitical and strategic rivalries that will determine the future shape of their relations in the years ahead.
Towards Cooperation
India has steadily moved a long way from the shadows of hostilities generated by the 1962 war and is today constructively engaged with China in building a stable and cooperative relationship. The momentous visit of the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 -the first ever such visit after the 1962 hostilities -was the first clear signal of India's readiness to end the stagnation and unfreeze the border issue which had immobilised Sino-Indian relations for over almost three decades. 3 The visit was a landmark in lifting the relationship to a qualitatively new level. It set in motion a process of mutual engagement, marked by a greater sense of pragmatism and realistic expectations for both parties.
The landmark agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the 'Line of Actual Control' (LAC) of 1993 was a breakthrough in terms of the clear commitment on the part of both countries to ensure a peaceful environment along the Sino-Indian borders, even as substantial points of difference remained between them over the final settlement of the disputed boundary issue. Both countries have since remained engaged in a steady and uninterrupted dialogue to find a just and rational settlement of the vexing border issue. An agreement on 'Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas' was signed in 1996. 4 Consequently, a number of confidence-building measures have been taken by the two countries to avert the threat of any accidental confrontation. 
China's Security Challenge: Discordant Notes on Border Settlement
Given the fact that a stable and cooperative framework of relationship has remained firmly in place over the years, one can assert with reasonable certainty that, barring any unfortunate turn of events, Sino-Indian relations will move on a more or less even keel in the foreseeable future. However, at the same time, the complex overlay of geographical proximity and historical memories on the Sino-Indian strategic landscape will make for strong undercurrents of competition and contest between the two Asian giants.
China undoubtedly represents a major long term, even primary, security challenge for India. While India has ample reasons to draw comfort from the steadily expanding ties with China, it also remains cognizant of the formidable reach of China's technological, military and nuclear capabilities across its borders. 13 It is important to note here that, notwithstanding India's readiness to engage with China without making border resolution a precondition for normalization of ties, the border dispute continues to remains a core concern in India's long term security perspectives. There is no doubt that SinoIndian borders have remained by, and large, conflict free since 1962. Furthermore, nobody in the Indian strategic community believes that given the configuration of forces on the ground and India's vastly altered power status, China will repeat any adventurist action against it, like in 1962. At the same time, India is keenly aware of the potential danger of unsolved borders which can be used as much as a strategic leverage as a territorial dispute by China, should it choose to do so at some future date.
To recall briefly, the boundary dispute centres around Aksai Chin in the western sector running into 40,000 square kilometres and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, running into 92,000 square kilometres, making Sino-Indian borders one of the longest disputed 15 Alerted by China's heightened activity in the development of rail & road links with Tibet, the Government of India admitted to taking 'necessary steps' 'for the upgradation of infrastructure and force structuring to secure the desired national security objectives along the Northern borders'. borders in the world. India's claim that the Sino-Indian borders were legally binding for both countries under existing treaties was refuted by China. China maintained that borders between the two countries had never been delineated or demarcated and the so called 'legal treaties' were a legacy of British imperialism, imposed unilaterally on China. That it would not hesitate to back its claims even by brutal force was underlined by its swift attack across the entire stretch of the borders in 1962, in which an unsuspecting and surprised India was defeated comprehensively by the Chinese forces. In its moment of complete victory, China declared a unilateral ceasefire, withdrawing from all the territories, barring the strategic Aksai Chin area that it had occupied during the brief, but decisive war. It also simultaneously warned India of severe reprisals, should it breach the ceasefire or cross the LAC in any sector. The situation has remained unchanged on the borders since, with India making no move to cross the LAC or alter the status quo.
Given the prevailing balance of power and China's geo-strategically advantageous position, India does not have much choice in accepting the ground realities. India has reconciled to the fact that China is 'in the driver's seat' and it is China, which will ultimately set the pace of finding a negotiated settlement of the border dispute. China has displayed a certain degree of pragmatism in not allowing varying perceptions of national security to derail the ongoing dialogue. Although, this does not detract from the fact that the resolution of the border issue is not a strategic priority or necessity for China, but a choice, which will be dictated by political expediency. China is keeping the initiative fully in its hands and has displayed no great urgency to move towards a speedy settlement. Not surprisingly, despite an agreement for spelling out the political parameters and guiding principles to delineate and demarcate the LAC in 2005, there has been no real progress on the final delineation and demarcation of the LAC.
On the contrary, China has sought to keep the question open and has not hesitated to up the ante by periodically raking up its claims on Arunachal Pradesh much to the discomfiture of India. China has consistently refused to issue visas to state officials from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that because the state is a part of Chinese territory, there is no need for any visas. At one point, it tried to score a point by even protesting against Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's electoral campaign in the State. Last year, it brazenly attempted to block funds from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to India on the ground that some of that money was to be used in Arunachal Pradesh.
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China also reacted sharply to the Dalai Lama's visit to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) which he declared, for the first time, as being part of India. This was particularly galling for China as Tawang holds special significance for Tibetans as the birth place of the 6 th Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama's statement came at a time when massive protests against the Chinese rule were taking place in Tibet. China officially cautioned India to exercise restraint and not to stir up trouble in the disputed area with a view to ensuring the sound development of China-India relations. It added as a pointed reminder that the two countries had never officially settled the demarcation of their border and China's stance on the Eastern sector of the China-India border was 'consistent and clear cut'. 20 India, on its part, reiterated that regardless of what others had to say, 'It is government of India's position that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of India'.
21
India recognises that China's consistent refrain on Arunachal Pradesh to mount pressure on India is, to no mean extent, a function of its own vulnerability in Tibet. Its tenuous hold on Tibet, even five decades after it moved its forces into the region, underlines its failure to achieve its declared objective of bringing Tibet firmly into the fold of the motherland. Seething unrest and insurgency in the sensitive region continues to make for a deep challenge to China's central authority. 22 The Dalai Lama's presence in India only heightens its anxieties and predicament in Tibet. Growing international popularity and support for the Dalai Lama, who is seen as a separatist figure by China, adds to its international embarrassment. India has steadfastly maintained that a grant of asylum to Dalai Lama, as a revered religious and cultural figure, was a purely humanitarian decision in keeping with its democratic traditions. The recent meeting of Mr Manmohan Singh with the Dalai Lama in August 2010 also reinforces this point. Aside from its repeated assurance that he would not be allowed to indulge in any political activities on the soil, India has not given into China's demand for imposing curbs on the Dalai Lama's travels within the country or abroad. India recognises that it is in no position to play the Tibet card, given its limitations in view of China's vastly superior capabilities and its potential to rake up old issues at its will and time of choosing. For the rest, India wants to keep its options open. India is in no hurry to curb the Dalai Lama's freedom or to mitigate China's long term concerns on Tibet.
India recognises that for China the border issue, as it was fifty years ago, is not only about territorial gains, but also about erosion of India's prestige as a major power. China had won the 1962 war, but had vacated most of the territory only to expose India's vulnerabilities and effectively shatter its image in the region. To that extent, China's posturing on the border issue is a reminder of the underlying volatility of Sino-Indian relations. Additionally, this underlines the potential dangers of the dispute being reignited to score political points of sovereignty that go beyond actual territorial claims. Unresolved borders will thus continue to make for deep concerns in India regarding its security and strategic engagement with China.
India's worries are magnified further with the rapid modernisation and upgrading of China's military facilities. The 60 th anniversary celebration of the PRC was centred on a massive display of China's military might and further exposed the widening gap in the military capabilities of the two countries. According to one source, China's defence budget in 2009 at US$75 billion was two and a half times larger than India's US$30 billion. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) is the world's largest army with a much higher ratio of men and artillery as compared to India. Furthermore, the acquisition of sophisticated fighter planes such J-11 and J-12, has served to greatly bolster the Chinese Air force, at the expense of India. According to one estimate, the Chinese will have as many as 2,300 combat aircrafts of the third/fourth generation by 2020 as compared to 750 aircrafts by India.
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India and South Asia
India remains a predominant power in South Asia, in terms of its size, location and power potential. It is, however, also aware of the need to carry the region with it in a cooperative framework to be able to fulfil its long term aspirations of playing a major role in global affairs. India therefore has a stake in not only playing a pivotal role in the region but also keeping it free from external powers' presence and interference. Cognizant of India's status as the most powerful South Asian nation, China has been reluctant to accept its unchallenged leadership in the region. Its strategy to counter balance India's power and influence in the region tends to raise India's security concerns vis-à-vis China's encroachment in its own backyard and remains an integral part of India's regional security perspectives.
Sino-Pak Entente: Strategic Concerns
The Sino-Pak alliance, in particular, ensconced as it is firmly in an anti-Indian construct, has been the single most complicating factor in India's regional security concerns. The Sino-Pak friendship has been durable primarily because it has proved of great value to both countries in furthering their common objective of keeping India under check. China has a clear interest in building Pakistan as an effective counter against India, eroding its wider role in the region and keeping its global ambitions at bay. Close defence cooperation with China has, on the other hand, not only bolstered Pakistan's defence and nuclear capabilities disproportionate to its power potential, but has also, in no small measure, enabled it to stand up to India and keep it mired within the sub-continental confines. Additionally, a major source of concern for India is the potential fallout of Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration on its long term strategic interests. By all accounts, China's significant assistance to Pakistan's nuclear programme has been critical to its emergence as a nuclear power in 1998. As widely reported, China began to provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan in the early 1980s, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequently, it also provided significant assistance in the development of Pakistan's ballistic missiles programme, including the short and medium range Ballistic Quite clearly unless Pakistan descends into greater chaos and there is complete failure on Islamabad's part to control the deleterious consequences of the rising tide of militant Islamic terrorism for Beijing, Sino-Pak relations are unlikely to waver on this score.
Any fundamental change in China's calculation of leveraging Pakistan as a useful counterweight to India's growing power is clearly not on the cards any time in the near future. As an analyst has argued, 'Pakistan is the only country that stands up to India and thereby prevents Indian hegemony over the region thus fulfilling the key objectives of China's South Asian policy'.
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More importantly, Pakistan is a trusted ally to keep India from emerging as an independent centre of power outside the sub-continental balance. This is particularly in view of the growing Indo-American strategic partnership which China sees as countering its growing power and influence in the region. With no prospects of China scaling down its support for Pakistan in the near future, it is clear that India will have to continue factoring Sino-Pak entente as a given in its larger regional security concerns for a long time.
China's Growing Role in India's Neighbourhood
It is equally important for India to factor in China's quest for expanding its presence and influence over the politics and security matrix of other neighbouring countries. Over the years, China has steadily increased its presence in South Asia and carefully crafted economic, political and military linkages with the smaller South Asian countries to find its own space in the region. India has reasons to be concerned about China's undisguised thrust to constrain its leadership and status in South Asia. On one hand, India's geostrategic location and power makes for its inevitable centrality in the region. Paradoxically, however, India's extensive religious, linguistic ethnic and cultural affiliations with its neighbours have led to greater psychological distance between them. Heightened anxieties regarding the smaller South Asians' national identities and sovereignty have led to greater discord with their bigger neighbour, India. In that context, bilateral issues of water sharing, trade and transit facilities, ethnic overspill and migration and, in more recent years, cross-border terrorism, have acquired such deeply emotive overtones that they continue to defy rational settlement.
On the other hand, China comes with no baggage of historical memories and bilateral disputes. More importantly, China is seen by many of India's smaller neighbours as an effective counterweight to India's preponderant power. This gives a certain edge on which China can capitalise on the prevalent anti-Indian sentiment to build its own bridges of friendship with these countries. Given these ground realities, China's gradual encroachment into India's traditional sphere of influence has long term implications for India's regional status which India cannot ignore. 37 China has over the years developed extensive military links with Bangladesh and has emerged as its largest military supplier. It signed a defence cooperation agreement with Bangladesh in 2002 and has also assisted it in developing a missile launching pad near Chittagong port. 38 The two countries have also signed an agreement for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. During the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to China in March 2010, China agreed to assist Bangladesh with the construction of a US$8.7 billion deep seaport in Chittagong. The port can be used for gaining access to harbours in Chittagong and Cox's Park as well as refuelling facilities for China's aircraft. China also desires to utilise this port as a passage for its southern Yunnan province and is for the same reason pushing for the construction of a road link between Chittagong and Kunming (in Yunnan).
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China has also steadily expanded its trade and economic cooperation with Sri Lanka, surpassing Japan as its largest aid donor. 40 Gradual reduction of aid and engagement by India, following Sri Lanka's poor human rights record, left a void which China was quick to utilise for its increased interaction with Sri Lanka. China has continued to play an important role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the northern and eastern provinces by upgrading facilities and infrastructure (roads, buildings and hospitals) in the country's war-affected areas. 41 It has been also actively collaborating with it in oil exploration and developing port and harbour facilities in Hambantota. Other significant projects include the construction of a second international airport at Hambantota, a US$855 million coal power plant at Norochcholai (to be connected to the national grid by early 2011) and a US$248 million expressway connecting the capital Colombo with the airport at Katunayake.
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China has also built a steady political relationship with Nepal, who has been ever willing to play the China card to offset India. India remains particularly sensitive to China's forays in Nepal given its strategic location on the northern border adjoining China. Chinese investment in infrastructural development in the Himalayan Kingdom has been extensive; it is presently engaged in building a rail line linking Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, to the Nepalese town Khasa on the Sino-Nepalese Border. 43 It has also extended generous financial assistance to Nepal and its annual aid has increased by 50 per cent to touch US$22 million.
China's growing links with Myanmar, which technically does not fall within South Asia, but abuts on India's sensitive eastern flank while also sharing borders with China, cause deep concern in India. China has over the past few years established extensive military linkages with significant arm sales and infrastructural development in Myanmar. China's remains Myanmar's largest benefactor in the supply of defence equipment and technical assistance. 44 China has also assisted with the construction of naval bases, roads waterways, and oil and gas pipelines to link Yunnan, its southernmost province, with Myanmar. China is also helping with the establishment and advancement of radar and communications systems and refuelling facilities at the Hainggyi, Coco, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Kyun, Myeik and Kyaukphyu ports. In August 2010, two Chinese warships made a visit to Myanmar's Thilawa Port in an effort to strengthen military and naval exchanges between the two countries.
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Closely related to the expansion of China's military and economic presence in its immediate neighbourhood is its relentless urge to secure the energy resources in the region. China and India are today one of the largest consumers of energy in the world and as their needs grow, they are bound to compete for control and access to markets and resources. India remains concerned about China's success in gaining exploration rights for developing natural gas fields in Bangladesh, which had earlier turned down India's proposal for a tri-national gas pipeline between India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. 46 China is also engaged in exploration and production of gas pipelines linking offshore platforms in Myanmar to Kunming in China. The 2,806km long natural gas line, with a capacity of 1 billion cubic meters annually, to Kunming is expected to be ready by 2012. India, which is expected to face a huge energy crunch in the years ahead, has yet to make any headway in accessing natural gas from either Bangladesh or Myanmar.
Deeply aware that China's inroads into India's immediate neighbourhood cuts into its power base, India has sought to mend its fences with its neighbours and taken manifold steps, even unilaterally, to strengthen its economic and political ties with these countries. Capitalising on a pro-India government in Bangladesh after many years, India has taken significant steps to engage with the government of Bangladesh on a number of issues. These include bilateral trade, financial aid and assistance, and cooperation on terrorism among others. India recently extended US$1 billion line of credit to Bangladesh. 47 The two countries are also developing land and sea transport links including the use of Mongla and Chittagong Sea ports, and the construction of the Akhuara-Agartala railway line. Similarly with Nepal, India has acceded to Nepal's long-standing demand for review of the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which has been seen by Nepal as compromising its autonomy in foreign and defence matters. It has also tried to offset China's growing investment in Nepal's infrastructure by a granting US$361 million for development of transportation links in the Terai region.
In recent years, India's policies in Myanmar have also undergone a visible shift in its engagement with the military junta. After realising that its deliberate distancing from the military government was benefitting China to consolidate its presence in the country at India's expense, 45 'Chinese Navy Escort Warships make Port Call in Myanmar', SINA English (29 August 2010), http://english.sina.com/china/p/2010/0829/336618.html, accessed on 2 September 2010. 46 The proposal has since been approved by the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh. 47 'Dhaka to pen $1 billion loan from India today', Daily Star (7 August 2010), www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=149733, accessed on 28 August 2010.
India has for the past few years been engaged in improving its relations with Myanmar. 48 It has taken several steps to woo Myanmar which remains important for India's strategic interests on its land borders as also for its maritime security in the Indian Ocean. India's interests in Myanmar are spread across a range of sectors including telecommunications, energy, agriculture, industry, IT and education. In line with these priorities, India has taken on a more active role in disbursing aid and building infrastructure. It has, for example, extended US$20 million credit for renovation of Thanlyan refinery and development of the Sittwe port, and is collaborating with the exploration of oil and gas projects with Myanmar. 49 It is also assisting in building a transport corridor to connect the port with Mizoram through the Kaladan River. The visit of Myanmar's senior leader General Than Shwe to New Delhi in July 2010 provided a further impetus to growing relations between the two countries.
Even as India accords the highest priority to its 'neighbourhood diplomacy' to maintain its preeminent position in South Asia, there is little doubt that China's growing influence in its own backyard serves to heighten India's long term strategic and economic concerns vis-à-vis its giant neighbour. More important, as long as China keeps up its pressure on India, there is little possibility of any let up in the subtle competition between India and China in India's neighbourhood in the foreseeable future.
India's Maritime Security: Emerging Challenges
As a major peninsular power, surrounded by sea on three sides, India also has a vital interest of maritime security in the Indian region, which it considers crucial for its security and trade. India has a clear stake in not only playing an active role in the region as a leading maritime power but also in protecting its strategic and economic interests by keeping the Indian Ocean free from any potentially inimical dominance by other powers. India has over the years expanded its naval and maritime influence and positioned itself to play a pivotal role in the region by upgrading its naval capabilities and carrying on naval exercises with other powers in the region.
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With its aspirations for playing a leading role in the region, India is increasingly finding its interests intersecting with China. It is particularly concerned about China's search for ports and military installations at various points stretching from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf to enhance its geopolitical and naval standing. China claims its 'string of pearls' strategy is geared to protecting the sea lines of communication to secure vital energy supplies for itself. India, however, sees the strategy as not only significantly boosting Chinese naval capabilities in the region where India has vital strategic, geopolitical, economic and energy interests, but also encircling India across its maritime borders. 51 China's search for naval bases and facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan virtually hems in India from all sides with long term implications for its maritime security.
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India in turn, has sought to shore up its naval projections by holding regular naval exercises with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore near the Andaman Islands, close to Coco Islands and near the strategic Straits of Malacca. China has openly criticised these exercises as seeking to contain its influence in a region where it has significant security concerns vis-à-vis Taiwan, the US and Japan. India's growing strategic relationship with Japan and the US is particularly troubling China, which sees both these countries as its strongest rivals in the region. India has steadily built a strong economic and defence relationship with Japan; Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership Agreement in 2006 has cemented the ties further, setting up a new framework for closer cooperation between the two countries in future. Although India is not projecting its ties with Japan in an anti-China construct, it remains fully aware of the fact that as a historic rival of China, Japan has a vested interest in a regional balance of power, which does not tilt in favour of China to Japan's disadvantage. As an analyst has put it, 'moves by India towards a quadrilateral "axis of democracies" with America, Australia and Japan, whilst not couched in overt anti-China terms, does have an element of China containment inherent in it'. 53 Although the strategy has already withered somewhat following Australia's public statement that it did not intend to be party to any anti-Chinese exercise, China remains wary of India's active participation in the region, which it has traditionally considered its sphere of influence. India has steadily emerged as an important player in Southeast Asia, with many people in the region seeing it as a balancer against China. There is little doubt that the ASEAN countries will have some interest in maintaining a geopolitical balance of power between India and China for maximising their economic strength and security. This could well lead to a quiet competition between China and India over expansion of their geopolitical influence and naval capabilities in the region.
India, United States and China: Emerging Balance of Alignments
As India continues its surge towards emerging as a key regional power, it is bound to engage in the global environment as an autonomous centre of power with its own regional agenda and global priorities. It will also continue to make efforts to seek its rightful place in the global community through strategic dialogue and partnership with other centres of power, particularly the US.
The US today remains the only power with the economic and military potential to impinge on a wide range of issues affecting India's national strategic interests. Recognising India's growing economic power and regional influence, the US has shown greater willingness to deal with India. In 2005, the US President George Bush called India a natural partner and publicly assured it of the US support in its rise as a major power. In 2006, the momentous Indo-US nuclear deal was signed, heralding a new chapter of mutual confidence and goodwill between the two countries.
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Apart from getting uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for the upgradation of its civilian facilities, India was informally admitted in the nuclear club, without having to formally sign the NPT. Significantly, Pakistan, a long-time ally, was not considered for a similar deal, signalling India's emergence as an independent centre of power in South Asia, after years of carrying the vexing burden of India-Pakistan parity on its shoulders. That the momentum of the Indo-US strategic partnership was irreversible, regardless of changes in the US administration, was brought to the fore by the US President Barack Obama when he reiterated, 'A fundamental pillar of America's comprehensive engagement with the world involves deepening our cooperation with the 21 st century centres of influence -and that includes India'. 58 India and the US 2009-2010. 59 The holding of the US-India Strategic Dialogue in June 2010 was a strong reflection of the progress made by the two countries on important issues of security, antiterrorism, nuclear disarmament, trade, technology, energy security, science and technology, and education.
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India does not presently rank very high on China's strategic radar, but the latter remains keenly aware of India's potential challenge. This is borne out by its steady opposition to India's bid for permanent membership of United Nations Security Council. China has also been resistant to the international, albeit informal, endorsement of India as a nuclear power, following the Indo-US nuclear deal. 61 It also views with unease India's steady strategic engagement with major global powers, particularly the US, which could increase its power capabilities and influence beyond its shores and emerge as a major rival for China in Asia and beyond. It is not surprising therefore that China has tended to view the warming Indo-US relations with some concern as potentially threatening its position in the region. According to a Chinese scholar, 'unlike the US, which worries about the rise of China and not the rise of India, what concerns China most is how to prevent the US-Indian relations from becoming a formal alliance in South Asia'. 62 China has exercised restraint in terms of any public statements against the improving the Indo-US relations for its own strategic reasons; China would not want to risk upsetting the US as this would have a detrimental effect on Sino-US relations. China and the US already have security concerns and deep seated mutual suspicions. The US is clearly uneasy with China's rapidly modernising military capabilities, human rights and intellectual property rights violations and balance of trade issues. China is unhappy with the US arms sales to Taiwan, its politicisation of human rights issues and the US pressure to devalue the yuan. Nevertheless, both countries are cooperating on several fronts. Both countries are cooperating in greater measure on global issues like human and drug trafficking, climate change, anti-terrorism, and nuclear weapon proliferation in their bilateral discussions. These are problems that cannot be solved individually by China or the US, as they are global in nature and any solution will require joint concerted action. Similarly, despite differences on trade issues, the economies of both countries are also highly dependent on each other. China holds 70 per cent of its 2 trillion foreign currency reserves in
The Road Ahead
As India seeks to play a major role in global affairs, its stake in the peace and stability in its immediate environment would call for the adoption of a climate of cooperation with China. At the same time, a greater challenge for Indian diplomacy is to engage with China in a cooperative framework within the larger context of geopolitical rivalry and competition between the two Asian giants. India will face increasing competition from China, as their interests intersect and overlap in both South Asia and beyond. This will make for inevitable contest and competition between the two countries in the foreseeable future.
In that context, it is clear that India's regional and global policies will be increasingly driven not so much by seeking to countervail China's preponderant power as by seeking to find its own place as a power of some consequence. India's broad orientation towards China will therefore have to rest on three pillars. The first will be to continue to engage with China within the parameters already set and accepted by both countries. In other words, it will seek a negotiated settlement to the vexing issue of disputed borders, whilst simultaneously expanding its ties in other areas of mutual interest, particularly economic, to generate stakes for continued cooperation. The second, given the uncertainties regarding the long term intentions of its more powerful and assertive neighbour, it will be prudent for India to continue building up its military strength to meet any future challenge from China. The third and last pillar will be to invest in building partnerships with its smaller neighbours in an overarching framework of bilateral and regional cooperation, enabling India to play a more constructive and positive role of leadership in region. As India gains enhanced economic and military power and greater recognition as a regional influential, it will be easier for it to engage with China in a more relaxed and balanced framework. More importantly, as India gradually works out new strategic equations with other major players to emerge as an influential centre of power beyond the confines of South Asia, it is bound to gain greater leverage and manoeuvrability vis-à-vis China.
As relations and domestic strengths progress, it will be as important to push for Sino-Indian cooperation as it will be to be prepared for greater competition with its powerful neighbour. The future of the Sino-Indian relations will, in the ultimate analysis, remain contingent not only on how the two countries manage their geopolitical rivalries and divergent strategic priorities, while dealing with each other, but also how they balance their competing interests and aspirations in dealing with the rest of the world. At best, the Sino-Indian relations will remain an exercise in finding equilibrium between the competing poles of cooperation and contest.
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